After all, one of the United States’ most significant adversaries, Russia, has been reduced to a second- or third-rate military power without a single U.S. They should also provide additional aid to help Ukraine on offense to maximize the possibility that it can retake as much territory as possible from Russia. Third, Ukraine still retains the initiative in the war, and the United States and other Western countries should provide long-term aid packages that help Ukraine strengthen its defense and prevent or deter a Russian counterattack in the future. In addition, Russia constructed substantial defensive fortifications, including minefields, and utilized attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) against advancing Ukrainian forces. Instead, it was likely caused by a Ukrainian change in force employment, especially the deliberate adoption of small-unit tactics, and the lack of key technology such as fighter aircraft for suppression of enemy air defense and close air support. Second, the reason for the slow pace of advance was not poor Ukrainian strategic choices, as some have argued. Carl von Clausewitz wrote in On War that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack” and that “the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.” Ukrainian forces averaged approximately 90 meters of advance per day during their recent push on the southern front between early June and late August 2023. ![]() This reality should not come as a major surprise. First, defense has the advantage in the war. The analysis comes to three main conclusions. Finally, the authors conducted interviews with Ukrainian, U.S., and European military officials. In addition, it uses satellite imagery and drone footage of the battlefield in eastern and southern Ukraine to understand the challenges of offensive operations. It also examines open-source data on fortifications, unit positions, and the attrition of military equipment. To understand historical rates of advance, this assessment compiles data on offensive campaigns from World War I through Ukraine’s 2023 offensive. This analysis utilizes several sources of information. When the defense has the advantage, it is generally easier to hold territory than it is to move forward and seize it. When the offense has the advantage, it is generally easier for an attacking state to destroy its opponent’s military and seize territory than it is to defend one’s own territory. The main idea is that there are several factors, such as geography, force employment, strategy, and technology, that can influence whether the offense or defense has the advantage. ![]() This phenomenon is called the “offense-defense balance,” and it refers to the relative strength between the offense and defense in warfare. Ukrainian operations raise the age-old question in warfare about whether it is easier for militaries to seize territory or defend it. What is the state of the offense-defense balance in the Ukraine war? What factors have impacted Ukrainian offensive operations? What are the policy implications for the United States and other Western countries? To better understand military operations in Ukraine, this analysis asks three questions. According to proponents of this view, the Ukrainian military mistakenly focused on conducting operations along multiple fronts rather than on a single front in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Some policymakers have erroneously argued that poor Ukrainian strategy has contributed to the slow pace of operations. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to liberate territory illegally seized by Russia, offensive operations have been slow. The war in Ukraine has become a test of political will and industrial capacity between two competing blocks: allied countries aiding Ukraine, such as the United States and numerous countries in Europe and Asia and axis countries aiding Russia, such as China, North Korea, and Iran. Ukrainian military progress is still possible, but the United States and other Western countries need to provide sustained military aid and other assistance. In particular, Russia has expanded the size of its minefields from 120 meters to 500 meters in some areas, making Ukraine the most heavily mined country in the world today. Russia’s extensive fortifications-which include minefields, trench networks, and support from artillery, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft-have slowed Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in the war but advanced an average of only 90 meters per day on the southern front during the peak of their summer offensive, according to new CSIS analysis.
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